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Abstract
Traditionally, it has been understood that campus sexual as-
sault adjudications need not take on the formalities of the justice 
system. Since the consequences faced in campus adjudications are 
considerably less than punishments faced in the justice system, less 
process is owed under the Due Process Clause. However, in Sep-
tember 2018, the Sixth Circuit reconceived what constitutes due 
process in campus sexual assault adjudications in the case of Doe 
v. Baum. The court found that in cases involving conflicting 
narratives at public universities, the accused or his agent must
have the ability to cross-examine his accuser in the presence of a 
neutral factfinder. On November 29, 2018, the Department of 
Education took Baum several steps further in a proposed rule-
making on Title IX, mandating cross-examination in all campus 
sexual assault cases at both public and private universities.
In this Comment, I argue that the proposed rulemaking on 
Title IX goes too far, misinterpreting the case law and the dic-
tates of due process, while neglecting empirical evidence and fore-
seen adverse consequences. I argue that the proposed rulemaking 
misinterprets case law—most notably the recent Baum deci-
sion—by failing to appreciate important limits to the scope of 
compulsory cross-examination. I also unpack the vast negative 
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implications of the proposed rulemaking, including drops in re-
porting rates and considerable institutional costs. As a result of 
these legal shortcomings and practical implications, I argue that 
the proposed rulemaking fails to pass the Mathews balancing 
test. As universities, the federal government, and courts deter-
mine how best to adjudicate campus sexual assault allegations, 
all efforts must be taken to minimize trauma to the victim, safe-
guard the rights of the accused, and protect the financial viability 
of educational institutions.
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Introduction
On April 4, 2011, the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) issued a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) with sweeping im-
plications for the scope of Title IX and the power of the federal gov-
ernment to shape sexual assault adjudications on college campuses.1 The 
DCL encouraged colleges and universities to better investigate and re-
solve instances of campus sexual assault.2 Notably, it required schools to 
use a preponderance of evidence standard3 in adjudicating campus sexu-
al assault cases.4 The impact of the DCL and its accompanying 2014 
Questions and Answers (Q&A) was clear and substantial. Colleges and 
universities adhered to a preponderance of evidence standard, hastened 
adjudications, and—perhaps most controversially—curtailed the ac-
cused’s confrontation rights by barring direct cross-examination.5
Under pressure from OCR and mounting public scrutiny, some 
schools ramped up their efforts to implement the DCL.6 Some
university adjudication procedures gained the reputation of “kangaroo 
courts”7 due to procedures that could interfere with the rights of the 
accused; this shifted sympathies and attention away from the accuser to 
1. See, e.g., KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter,
WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-to-obamas-dear-colleague-
letter/?utm_term=.4d4c7af22313.
2. Jake New, Must v. Should, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/25/colleges-frustrated-lack-
clarification-title-ix-guidance.
3. The preponderance of evidence standard is typically used in civil trials; it is met 
“when the party with the burden convinces the fact finder that there is a greater than 
50% chance that the claim is true.” Preponderance of the Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_of_the_evidence. Before the 2011 
Dear Colleague Letter, some schools used the “clear and convincing” standard “(i.e., 
it is highly probable or reasonably certain that the sexual harassment or violence oc-
curred).” Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Violence 10–11 (Apr. 
4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[hereinafter DCL]. As the DCL aptly noted, “[g]rievance procedures that use this 
higher standard are inconsistent with the standard of proof established for violations 
of the civil rights laws, and are thus not equitable under Title IX. Therefore, prepon-
derance of the evidence is the appropriate standard for investigating allegations of 
sexual harassment or violence.” Id.
4. DCL, supra note 3, at 12.
5. See Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies, and Justice, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice.
6. Id.
7. For example, a court ignoring recognized standards of justice.
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the accused.8 Advocates of the accused insisted that universities rushed 
to judgments with inadequate processes to compensate for past 
procedural failures.9 Clamor for safeguarding the due process rights of 
the accused mounted.
In the wake of this progression, there have been two substantial de-
velopments reshaping the definition of due process in campus sexual as-
sault adjudications. First, the Sixth Circuit redefined due process rights 
for the accused in Doe v. University of Cincinnati10 and Doe v. Baum.11
These decisions established that in cases involving credibility disputes, 
the accused or their agent must have the ability to cross-examine their 
accuser in the presence of a neutral factfinder.12 Second, the Department 
of Education sought to codify and expand cross-examination of the vic-
tim in its notice of a proposed rulemaking on Title IX (“proposed rule-
making”).13 As part of this proposed rulemaking, the Department of 
Education recommended a live hearing and cross-examination by party 
advisors in all campus sexual assault adjudications.14 Despite Sixth Cir-
cuit precedent that seems to support the proposed rulemaking,15 the le-
gal and practical foundations on which these sweeping changes rest are 
murky.
In this Comment, I argue that the proposed rulemaking on Title 
IX goes too far: It misinterprets case law and the dictates of due process 
while neglecting empirical evidence and adverse consequences. I begin 
by providing a brief background of Title IX and the Due Process Clause 
as it pertains to higher education. Then, in Section I, I argue that the 
proposed rulemaking mischaracterizes Baum and improperly extends its 
reach. I point out that the court in Baum overstepped and that Baum 
does not reflect national consensus on cross-examination in campus sex-
ual assault adjudications. I also emphasize that determining the dictates 
of due process is a job best left for the courts, not the Department of 
Education. In Section II, I discuss the lack of empirical support for the 
value of these expansions.
8. See Kathryn Joyce, The Takedown of Title IX, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/magazine/the-takedown-of-title-ix.html.
9. See, e.g., id.
10. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 402–404 (6th Cir. 2017).
11. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
12. See generally Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 393; Baum, 903 F.3d at 575.
13. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Rulemaking].
14. See id. at 61,476.
15. See generally Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 393; Baum, 903 F.3d at 575.
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Section III argues that the proposed rulemaking fails to appreciate 
and counteract the vast repercussions of compulsory, live cross-
examination, which include adverse implications for reporting rates and 
victim trauma, as well as substantial institutional costs.16 Due to the 
considerable consequences of this proposed rulemaking and its spurious 
empirical or legal support, I argue that this proposal fails the Mathews
balancing test by overextending the due process rights afforded to the 
accused while minimizing those of the victim.17 In sum, I argue that the 
Department of Education should refrain from mandating adversarial 
cross-examination in campus sexual assault adjudications.
Background on Title IX
Title IX was passed in 1972 as part of the Education Amendments 
to the Civil Rights Act.18 It bars sex discrimination in any educational 
program or activity that accepts federal funding.19 This captures the 
majority of colleges and universities since virtually all schools receive 
some form of federal funding.20 Although Title IX does not explicitly 
bar sexual assault or harassment, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
these abuses are a prohibited form of sex discrimination under Title IX 
in 1990.21 Over the subsequent two decades, the definition of what 
behaviors constitute sexual assault or harassment broadened, while 
16. None of the arguments presented in this Comment should be construed to under-
mine the importance of cross-examination in criminal adjudications. The balance of 
equities is significantly distinguishable for many reasons, notably the potential penal-
ties for criminal conviction, which include prison and sexual offender registration. 
Moreover, safeguards in the criminal context are lacking in campus adjudications, 
such as adherence to the rules of evidence, as well as legal representation and a trained 
adjudicator. In addition, the balance of power is distributed differently when the 
State pursues charges against a suspect compared with when a survivor of sexual as-
sault brings a complaint against their assailant.
17. Discussion of the accusers’ due process rights is beyond the scope of this Comment.
18. 20 U.S.C. §/1681 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
19. See id.
20. Federal funding is defined broadly to encompass such activities as students receiving 
Pell Grants. See, e.g., Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason Some Re-
ligious Colleges Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-
some-religious-colleges-forgo-federal-funding/490253/ (noting that a small number 
of religious institutions, such as Hillsdale College, refuse to accept federal funding 
and forbid students to accept Pell Grants as a means of evading government regula-
tions).
21. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
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expectations for schools to promptly and fairly resolve complaints 
grew.22
In 2011, OCR issued a DCL,23 which was later clarified by a 2014 
Q&A.24 The DCL was notable for many changes, such as hastening 
sexual assault adjudications and mandating that schools adhere to the 
preponderance standard.25 Notably, the DCL strongly discouraged “al-
lowing the parties personally to question or cross-examine each other 
during the hearing,” indicating that direct questioning could be “trau-
matic or intimidating.”26 Some schools interpreted this as a pseudo-
requirement to bar cross-examination, as demonstrated by policy chang-
es at various schools.27 In 2014, the Q&A clarified that schools can “al-
low parties to submit questions to a trained third party to ask the ques-
tions on their behalf.”28 They recommended that the trained third party 
screen the questions and exclude inappropriate or irrelevant questions.29
A circumscribed form of cross-examination was thus permissible under 
the 2011 DCL.
On September 22, 2017, the Department of Education issued a 
new DCL rescinding the 2011 DCL and 2014 Q&A.30 Three days later, 
the Sixth Circuit held in Doe v. University of Cincinnati that when pub-
lic universities are tasked with resolving conflicting narratives, they must 
provide the accused with some form of cross-examination, though it 
22. In 1999, the Department of Education formally advised schools to “adopt and pub-
lish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student 
and employee [Title IX] complaints.” This put schools on notice of their obligation 
to rapidly and fairly resolve complaints including sexual assault and harassment. In 
1997 and again in 2001, OCR issued guidance for sexual assault adjudications on 
college campuses. These documents formally defined harassment and emphasized the 
importance of “well-publicized and effective grievance procedures.” Sara O’Toole, 
Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication, Student Due Process, and a Bar on Direct Cross-
Examination, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 511, 516 (2018).
23. DCL, supra note 3.
24. Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dept. of Educ. Office for 
Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence (Apr. 24, 
2014), https://perma.cc/A7W8-J8PR [hereinafter Q&A].
25. DCL, supra note 3, at 13.
26. Id. at 12.
27. The University of Virginia, Yale University, and the University of Texas all changed 
their policies in light of the OCR letter. See O’Toole, supra note 22, at 518.
28. Q&A, supra note 24, at 31.
29. Id.
30. Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.
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need not take the form of direct confrontation at a live hearing.31 The 
court found it acceptable for both parties to submit questions to the 
trier of fact, who would then pose questions to the witnesses directly.32
Less than a year after University of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit expand-
ed the definition of what type of confrontation the accused is owed in 
Doe v. Baum. In a split circuit decision, the court held that when credi-
bility disputes exist, the accused or his agent must have the ability to 
cross-examine the victim in the presence of a neutral factfinder.33 Like in 
University of Cincinnati, the scope of the decision in Baum was expressly 
limited to public universities.34
Taking note of the decision in Baum, the Department of Educa-
tion took up the issue of cross-examination in the proposed rulemaking 
released on November 29, 2018.35 The proposed rulemaking mandates 
a live hearing as well as cross-examination by a party advisor in campus 
sexual assault adjudications.36 Notably, it extends beyond Baum in 
scope, applying to both public and private institutions and expanding 
its reach beyond cases where credibility is in dispute.37
Background on Due Process Rights in Higher Education
In order to assess whether cross-examination is required under the 
Due Process Clause in campus sexual assault adjudications, the dictates 
of due process must be examined. The Fifth Amendment asserts that 
“no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
31. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017). See also Doe v. Univ. 
of S. Cal., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that credibility 
disputes are the norm in campus sexual assault adjudications).
32. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 396–97 (citing Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437, 
439, 448 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that this requirement was met even where the trier 
of fact did not ask all the questions submitted or allow an opportunity to submit fol-
low-up questions)).
33. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
34. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
35. A leaked earlier draft shows that the rule on cross-examination was added in the wake 
of Baum. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Civil Rights, Proposed Regulation Concern-
ing Title IX (unpublished draft) (Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with ATIXA), 
https://cdn.atixa.org/website-media/o_atixa/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
18120534/Draft-OCR-regulations-September-2018.pdf. See also Erica L. Green, 
New U.S. Sexual Misconduct Rules Bolster Rights of Accused and Protect Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/us/politics/devos-
campus-sexual-assault.html (noting the main components of the leaked draft).
36. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 61,474–75.
37. See id.
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of law.”38 This applies to the federal government and was extended to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Due process is impli-
cated when a state actor violates a protected interest, and it is necessary 
to discern what process is owed. Notice and an opportunity to be heard 
have been held as fundamental requirements of due process.40 Beyond 
these basic tenets, the requisite type of notice and opportunity to be 
heard is context specific and depends on a number of factors. The Su-
preme Court precedent of Mathews v. Eldridge offers a balancing test to 
determine the requirements of due process in a discrete context. 
Mathews implores adjudicators to consider three key factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.41
The Mathews test provides a clear framework to ascertain whether di-
rect, adversarial cross-examination is required in campus sexual assault
adjudications at public institutions.
Public schools are considered state actors and must comply with 
the Due Process Clause, while private schools are exempt from this 
mandate.42 The scope of institutions that must comply with the Due 
Process Clause is therefore narrower than the range of schools that must 
abide by Title IX.43
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Lavinia M. Weizel, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence as the 
Standard of Proof for University Adjudication of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault 
Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2012) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976)).
41. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 320.
42. See THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, STUDENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT:
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORKS FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (DISCUSSION DRAFT)
22 (2018) (noting “federal constitutional requirements apply only to public institu-
tions (and to those private institutions sufficiently entwined with public institutions 
to be treated as ‘state actors’)”). Most private institutions do not meet this exception.
43. As previously mentioned, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in any educational 
program or activity that accepts federal funding. 20 U.S.C §/1681 (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 116-91).
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In the educational context, due process protections for the accused 
emanate from threats to protected liberty or property interests.44 In Goss 
v. Lopez, the Court found that protected liberty and property interests 
are implicated when a primary school student faces expulsion.45 The 
property interest is tied to a state statute providing for compulsory K-12
public education,46 while the liberty interest stems from the reputational 
damage of a misconduct charge.47 Accordingly, notice and a hearing are 
required when a primary school student faces a potential expulsion.48
The protected interests implicated in the higher education setting 
are not as strong. In particular, the property interest in higher education 
is weaker, given that unlike K-12 education, the right to higher educa-
tion is not guaranteed by law.49 Furthermore, courts have been reluctant 
to recognize a protected liberty interest in the higher education setting.50
The Supreme Court has yet to recognize a protected liberty or property 
interest in higher education.51 It is thus unsurprising that the Court in 
Missouri v. Horowitz found that the absence of a live hearing prior to the 
expulsion of a medical student did not violate the student’s due process 
44. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
45. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
46. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573.
47. Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
48. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
49. Kristina Johnson, State Univ. of N.Y., Comment Letter on ED Title IX Proposed 
Regulations (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-
OCR-0064-11388 [hereinafter SUNY Comment] (noting elementary and secondary 
education is “a right guaranteed by federal law and state law in every jurisdiction in 
the United States,” while higher education is not a legal right). See also Goss, 419 U.S. 
at 574 (noting that students have a “legitimate entitlement to a public education as a 
property interest”). The Court has not found that this right extends to higher educa-
tion. SUNY Comment at 58–59.
50. See, e.g., Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84 (1978) (“We 
need not decide, however, whether respondent’s dismissal deprived her of a liberty in-
terest in pursuing a medical career. Nor need we decide whether respondent’s dismis-
sal infringed any other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation without 
procedural due process.”).
51. See O’Toole, supra note 22, at 524.
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rights.52 It is clear that under the Constitution less process is owed in the 
higher education context.53
I. The Proposed Rulemaking Lacks a Strong Legal Foundation
The merits of the proposed rulemaking and its capacity to prevail 
under the Mathews framework depend in large part on its legal founda-
tion. This section will assess the myriad of flaws in the substantive legal 
underpinnings of the proposed rulemaking.
First, the proposed rulemaking mischaracterizes Baum and overex-
tends that case’s reach by asserting that it controls not just when credi-
bility is at issue but rather in all sexual assault adjudications. The pro-
posed rulemaking misconstrues Baum in the context of campus sexual 
assault. Second, Baum was an unwarranted decision where the majority 
overreached in its responsibility; and therefore, the proposed rulemaking 
relies on mere dicta. Third, Baum does not represent the consensus ap-
proach to sexual assault adjudications—it is an outlier within the cur-
rent circuit split.
A. The Proposed Rulemaking Misconstrues 
Baum and Overextends Its Reach
Doe v. Baum involved a case of alleged sexual assault at the Univer-
sity of Michigan.54 Complainant “Roe” and respondent “Doe” had sex 
after a fraternity party, and Roe alleged that she had been too drunk to 
consent.55 A three-month investigation ensued.56 Ultimately, the investi-
gator reported that there was insufficient evidence to find that it was 
more probable than not that sexual misconduct occurred.57 Roe ap-
52. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84. In recent Sixth Circuit cases, judges have assumed the 
existence of protected interests in higher education adjudications without substantive 
grounding. For example, in Baum, the court does not discuss liberty or property in-
terests in dispute. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018). In University of Cin-
cinnati, the court makes a conclusory assertion that liberty and property interests are 
implicated. See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017).
53. However, this does not mean that no process is owed. Protected interests, regardless 
of their strength, can likely be assumed based on circuit and district court precedent. 
See Weizel, supra note 40, at 1621–22.
54. Baum, 903 F.3d at 579.
55. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
56. Baum, 903 F.3d at 579.
57. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
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pealed.58 The appeals board reversed based on the investigator’s report 
alone, finding Roe’s recollection of events to be “more credible” than 
Doe’s.59 This forced Doe to withdraw from the University of Michi-
gan.60 He then filed a lawsuit arguing that when investigations are 
tasked with resolving conflicting narratives, the school must provide a 
hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse 
witnesses.61 The University of Michigan filed and was granted a motion 
to dismiss at the district level.62 Doe appealed.63 The Sixth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the University of Michigan’s failure to provide Doe 
an opportunity for cross examination violated his due process rights.64
The court found that in cases where credibility is in dispute, the accused 
must be afforded at least a circumscribed form of cross-examination.65
The proposed rulemaking mischaracterizes Baum,66 obviating its 
limitation to cases where credibility is in dispute and improperly extend-
ing its reach to private institutions. The proposed rulemaking asserts 
that Baum held that “in the Title IX context cross-examination is not 
just a wise policy, but is a constitutional requirement of Due Process.”67
However, the opinion in Baum was more limited and nuanced. Baum
held that cross-examination is only required in those cases where the 
“university has to choose between competing narratives to resolve a 
case.”68 Credibility disputes may be “more common” in sexual assault 
adjudications than in other contexts.69 However, there are at least two 
examples where cross-examination is not necessary: (1) when conduct 
depicted in videos and photos can sustain a finding of misconduct with-
58. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
59. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2018).
60. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
61. Doe also argued that the Board violated Title IX by discriminating against him on 
account of his gender. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
62. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
63. Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
64. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
65. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 2018).
66. It should be noted that Baum is arguably the principal source of legal support for the 
proposed rulemaking, as it is one of two cited cases for this rule. It is also the most 
topical and current of the cited cases. See generally Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 
13, at 61,476.
67. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 61,476 (emphasis added).
68. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
69. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 406 (6th Cir. 2017). See also Doe v. Univ. 
of S. Cal., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that credibility 
disputes are typical “in disciplinary proceedings involving sexual misconduct where 
there is no corroborating physical evidence to assist the adjudicator in resolving con-
flicting accounts”).
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out resorting to testimonial evidence,70 and (2) where a student admits 
to engaging in misconduct.71 Baum leaves space for cases where credibil-
ity is not in dispute.
The proposed rulemaking also obscures the scope of the Baum
precedent and the reach of the Due Process Clause. After noting that 
Baum established cross-examination as a “constitutional requirement of 
Due Process” the proposed rulemaking asserts that live cross-
examination is a requirement in all campus sexual assault adjudica-
tions.72 However, Baum limited the scope of mandatory cross-
examination to contexts where “a public university has to choose be-
tween competing narratives.”73 This fits squarely with the Due Process 
Clause’s limited application to public institutions.74 Private institutions 
are not constrained by the Constitution and are free to formulate their 
own disciplinary procedures.75 Baum did not establish “an affirmative 
right to adversarial cross-examination” in all cases and contexts, nor 
could it.76
B. Doe v. Baum was an Unwarranted Decision
Not only does the proposed rulemaking misconstrue Baum, but 
Baum itself was wrongly decided. As Judge Keith Starrett pointed out in 
a case distinguishing Baum, “the majority in Baum went too far,” be-
cause the court was called upon merely to review a motion to dismiss, 
not to make a ruling on the merits.77 According to Judge Starrett, the 
court should have found, based on case precedent, that a circumscribed 
form of cross-examination was warranted in the case, and therefore held 
that “such an allegation does state a claim and reverse” the court be-
low.78 The court was not compelled to ascertain precisely what form of 
70. Baum, 903 F.3d at 584 (citing Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 775–76
(5th Cir. 2017)).
71. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Flaim v. Med. Coll. of 
Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005)).
72. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 61,476.
73. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
74. See THE AM. LAW INST., supra note 42, at 22.
75. See HARVEY A. SILVERGATE ET AL., FIRE’S GUIDE TO FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 60
(Greg Lukianoff & William Creeley, eds., 2d ed. 2012).
76. Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 658–59
(2018).
77. Doe v. Univ. of S. Miss., No. 2:18-cv-00153, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 27, 
2018).
78. Univ. of S. Miss., slip op. at 7.
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cross-examination was required.79 Its discussion of the matter is a judi-
cial overreach and serves as “mere dicta.”80
The holding in Baum also improperly relies on criminal cases to 
buttress its argument for cross-examination’s supposed constitutional 
mandate in the educational context.81 Title IX is a civil rights law, not a 
criminal law.82 The school disciplinary process is therefore distinct from 
the criminal justice system.83 The process owed to accused students in 
campus sexual assault adjudications is far less than what is owed to 
defendants in the criminal justice system; this is based primarily on the 
severity of the punishment in question.84 Students in sexual assault 
adjudications may receive punishments of temporary dismissal or, in 
rare cases, expulsion or transcript notations.85 They do not face prison, 
fines, sex offender registration, or other forms of criminal sanction or 
deprivation of liberty.86 Courts have asserted time and again that 
campus sexual assault adjudications “need not take on the formalities of 
a criminal trial,” and that procedural protections afforded to students 
need not match those of a criminal prosecution.87 In fact, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “school disciplinary proceedings should not 
79. Univ. of S. Miss., slip op. at 7.
80. Univ. of S. Miss., slip op. at 8.
81. Defendant’s Supplement in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Univ. of S. Miss., 
No. 3:18-cv-00138 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2018).
82. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS:
TITLE IX PROHIBITS SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE WHERE YOU GO
TO SCHOOL 1 (2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title-ix-rights-
201104.pdf (noting that Title IX “is a Federal civil rights law”).
83. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 54; see also Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence 
Reports, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/issues/schools-handle-sexual-
violence-reports/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (noting how colleges and universities re-
spond to campus sexual assault outside of the criminal justice system).
84. See SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 55.
85. Students are rarely expelled for campus sexual assault. Although temporary dismissal 
is more common, both sanctions are rarer than less serious sanctions. See, e.g., Tyler 
Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in Expulsion,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017, 8:59 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/campus-
sexual-assault_n_5888742. Transcript notations are even rarer and are only required 
in New York and Virginia. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 6444(6) (McKinney 2019); VA.
CODE ANN. § 23.1-900 (2019); Jake New, Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(July 10, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-
colleges-note-sexual-assault-responsibility-student-transcripts.
86. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 60.
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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track the judicial system.”88 Accordingly, it is improper for the Sixth 
Circuit to “graft[] the Sixth Amendment onto student disciplinary 
proceedings.”89
C. Baum is Not the Consensus Approach
The proposed rulemaking is improperly grounded in the Depart-
ment of Education’s flawed reading of a single, split circuit decision: 
Baum.90 The Sixth Circuit approach is “inconsistent with myriad deci-
sions of other circuits and state law.”91 For example, the First Circuit re-
cently refused to apply the Baum precedent, noting that the decision 
went too far in mandating that state schools facilitate cross-examination 
by the accused or their representative in all cases where credibility is in 
dispute.92 The First Circuit pointed out that while it could “easily join”
the Baum precedent, it “[took] seriously the admonition that student 
disciplinary proceedings need not mirror common law trials.”93 Addi-
tionally, the Second Circuit has held that cross-examination is not an 
“essential requirement of due process” in campus disciplinary adjudica-
tions.94 The Eleventh Circuit has also found that “cross-examination of 
witnesses and a full adversary proceeding” need not be provided so long 
as “basic fairness” is preserved.95 Other circuits have emphasized that 
campus adjudications should not mirror the judicial system.96 Precedent 
mirroring Baum at the circuit level is lacking.97
88. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 400 (citing Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 
860 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 2017)).
89. Defendant’s Supplement in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 81, at 5.
90. It should be noted that the Sixth Circuit to date has not overturned this precedent.
91. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 60.
92. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 69 (1st Cir. 2019). The First Cir-
cuit has traditionally held that “the right to unlimited cross-examination has not been 
deemed an essential requirement of due process in school disciplinary cases.” Gorman 
v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988).
93. Haidak, 933 F.3d at 69–70. The First Circuit also noted that it had “no reason to 
believe that questioning of a complaining witness by a neutral party is so fundamen-
tally flawed as to create a categorically unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation”
and that “[if] we were to insist on a right to party-conducted cross-examination, it 
would be a short slide to insist on the participation of counsel able to conduct such 
examination, and at that point the mandated mimicry of a jury-waived trial would be 
near complete.” Id.
94. Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987).
96. See, e.g., Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A] 
school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative courtroom.”)
The court in Plummer refused to determine “whether confrontation and cross-
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Recent district court decisions outside the Sixth Circuit have not 
followed Baum. For example, a court in the Second Circuit recently 
held that “while the Baum court did hold that a university must allow 
cross examination by a representative, that holding is not binding on 
this Court.”98 Additionally, a court in the Third Circuit repudiated 
Baum in Doe v. Princeton University, noting that there is “no authority 
showing that the Third Circuit or this Court has adopted the same rea-
soning.”99 In early 2019, courts in the Second Circuit100 and Eighth Cir-
cuit101 held that a circumscribed form of cross-examination is acceptable. 
Additionally, courts in the Fourth Circuit recently found that “the ac-
cused” is not entitled to “trial-like” rights of confrontation or cross-
examination at disciplinary proceedings.102 District courts in the Fifth
Circuit,103 Seventh Circuit,104 Tenth Circuit,105 Eleventh Circuit,106 and 
D.C. Circuit107 also have yet to adopt Baum.
examination would ever be constitutionally required in student disciplinary proceed-
ings.” Id. at 775.
97. See Mann, supra note 76, at 658 (noting “no federal appellate court has held that 
there is an affirmative right to adversarial cross-examination in the educational con-
text”).
98. Doe v. Haas, No. 19-CV-0014 (DRH) (AKT), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211575, at 
*26 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019).
99. Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 18-16539 (MAS) (LHG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4449, 
at *20 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2019). A recent Third Circuit decision “decline[d] to address”
Baum with regard to the issue of cross-examination in campus sexual assault adjudica-
tions. See Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., No. 19-358, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125592, at 
*9 (E.D Pa. July 29, 2019).
100. Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., No. 1:18-CV-1374 (FJS/CFH), 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5396, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019).
101. “Doe was afforded an opportunity to submit questions to the hearing panel for cross-
examination of Roe and other witnesses.” Doe v. Univ. of Ark-Fayetteville, No. 5:18-
CV-05182, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57889, at *27 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2019).
102. Byerly v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-16, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49952, at *20–21 (W.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2019). See also Doe v. Fairfax Cty. 
Sch. Bd., No. 1:19-cv-65 (AJT/MSN), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170577, at *21 (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 11, 2019) (noting that “[d]ue process does not require the opportunity to 
cross-examine the accuser or witnesses, as the Fourth Circuit ‘has not found a basis in 
the law’ for ‘importing’ the right to cross-examination ‘into the academic context’”).
103. Although this may change in the case of Doe v. University of Mississippi, No. 3:18-
CV-138-DPJ-FKB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7490, at *25 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 16, 2019).
104. The Seventh Circuit recently declined to examine whether adversarial cross-
examination is required in campus sexual assault adjudications. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 
928 F.3d 652, 664 n.4 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “[b]ecause John has otherwise al-
leged procedural deficiencies sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, we need not 
address” whether John was entitled to cross-examine Jane in light of the Baum prece-
dent).
105. Although this may change in the case of Norris v. University of Colorado-Boulder, 362 
F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1020 (D. Colo. 2019), which noted that the Tenth Circuit has 
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Courts in the Ninth Circuit have perhaps been the most favorable 
to Baum.108 In Powell v. Montana State University, the court noted that 
“[a]lthough the Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted the [Baum prece-
dent], it has expressed its view that a charge resulting in a disciplinary 
suspension of a student ‘may require more formal procedures’ to satisfy 
components of our system of constitutional due process.”109 A California 
state appeals court also recently embraced the Baum precedent, finding 
that “[w]here credibility is central to a university’s determination, a stu-
dent accused of sexual misconduct has a right to cross-examine the ac-
cuser . . . if the university does not want the accused to cross-examine 
the accuser under any scenario, then it must allow a representative to do 
so.”110 Proponents of Baum may suggest that these decisions are indica-
tive of changing tides in the Ninth Circuit and even nationally. Howev-
er, at this juncture, the majority of circuit courts and lower district 
courts have yet to find that direct, adversarial cross-examination is re-
quired by the Due Process Clause in all cases at public institutions 
where credibility is in dispute.111
not yet adopted Baum, but that “several district courts have found that a lack of 
meaningful cross-examination may contribute to a violation of due process rights of 
an accused student in a disciplinary hearing regarding sexual assault.”
106. Shepard’s search of Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) in the 11th Circuit, 
LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com/ (search 903 F.3d 575; then click “Shep-
ardize this document”).
107. Shepard’s search of Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) in the D.C. Circuit, 
LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com/ (search 903 F.3d 575; then click “Shep-
ardize this document”).
108. See Powell v. Mont. State Univ., No. CV 17-15-BU-SEH, 2018 WL 6728061, at *7 
(D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2018).
109. Powell, No. CV 17-15-BU-SEH, 2018 WL 6728061, at *7 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 
2018). It should be noted that the assertions by the Montana District Court ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment in Powell may not be indicative of the Ninth 
Circuit as a whole.
110. Doe v. Allee, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
111. See Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2019); Plum-
mer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 2017); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 
812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987); Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549–50
(2d Cir. 1972); Doe v. Haas, No. 19-CV-0014 (DRH)(AKT), 2019 WL 6699910, 
at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019); Doe v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 403 F. Supp. 3d 
508, 520 (E.D. Va. 2019); Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., No. 19-358, 2019 WL 
3413821, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2019); Byerly v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State 
Univ., No. 7:18-cv-162019, 2019 WL 1370873, at *8 (W.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2019); 
Doe v. Univ. of Miss., 361 F. Supp. 3d 597, 613 (S.D. Miss. 2019); Doe v. Rensse-
laer Polytechnic Inst., No. 1:18-CV-1374 (FJS/CFH), 2019 WL 181280, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y Jan. 11, 2019); Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 18-16539 (MAS) (LHG), 
2019 WL 161513, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2019).
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Although adjudications in various circuits are ongoing and there is 
potential for the Baum precedent to expand, the Department of Educa-
tion should step aside and leave these decisions to the courts. Discerning 
the dictates of due process is a job vested in the courts, not the Depart-
ment of Education.112 Indeed, “[c]ourts have superior competence in in-
terpreting—and constitutionally vested authority and responsibility to 
interpret—the content of the Constitution.”113 Although judges are im-
plored to afford considerable deference to agency interpretations of their 
own organic statutes, they need not defer to agency interpretations of 
the Constitution.114
II. The Proposed Rulemaking Lacks a 
Strong Empirical Foundation
This section explores the value of cross-examination in campus 
sexual assault adjudications. None of the arguments presented here 
should be construed to advocate for eliminating cross-examination in 
criminal settings. The next section further explores key differences be-
tween those contexts.
In campus sexual assault adjudications, there is an absence of em-
pirical evidence for the unique importance of direct, adversarial cross-
examination as a truth-finding device. In improperly overextending the 
scope of the Baum precedent, the proposed rulemaking fails to detail 
compelling justifications for mandating direct, adversarial cross-
examination. The only support115 the Department of Education pro-
vides for this extension is a citation to the conclusory John Henry Wig-
more quote, asserting that cross-examination is the ‘‘greatest legal engine 
112. See Doe v. Univ. of S. Miss., No. 2:18-cv-00153, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 27, 
2018) (citing Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 58 F. Supp. 
3d 1191, 1232 (D.N.M. 2014)).
113. Jarita Mesa, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1232.
114. See, e.g., Jarita Mesa, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1232 (citing U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 
F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999)) (“Courts afford agencies no deference in inter-
preting the Constitution.”); Univ. of S. Miss., slip op. at 9.
115. The proposed rulemaking does cite to Doe v. Baum, which goes slightly further in its 
explanation of the value of cross-examination and emphasizes that “[w]ithout the 
back-and-forth of adversarial questioning, the accused cannot probe the witness’s sto-
ry to test her memory, intelligence, or potential ulterior motives. Nor can the fact-
finder observe the witness’s demeanor under that questioning.” 903 F.3d 575, 582 
(6th Cir. 2018). Still, this explanation fails to offer support for how adversarial meth-
ods are more effective in probing memory, intelligence, and ulterior motives.
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ever invented for the discovery of truth.’’116 However, even this conclu-
sory quotation is taken out of context, as Wigmore went on to offer a 
caveat that “[a] lawyer can do anything with cross-examination . . . He
may, it is true, do more than he ought to do; he . . . may make the truth 
appear like falsehood.”117 As Wigmore himself recognized, cross-
examination can distort the truth and hinder just outcomes.118
In fact, there is a lack of empirical evidence for the importance of 
cross-examination as a truth-finding device. Baum claims that cross-
examination is uniquely valuable in highlighting confusion and gaps in 
memory, uncovering potential ulterior motives, and providing valuable 
demeanor evidence.119 However, experimental support indicates the op-
posite. Below, I deal with each of these proposed benefits of cross-
examination in turn.
First, some scholars suggest cross-examination is most useful in re-
vealing gaps in memory and problems in perception.120 However, cross-
examination is not uniquely valuable for this purpose. Forgetfulness or 
confusion can just as easily be highlighted by presenting conflicting tes-
timony in the absence of cross-examination.121 Additionally, errors in 
recollection may be more indicative of witness truthfulness than decep-
116. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61476 (Nov. 29, 2018) (to be cod-
ified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106); Education Law Center, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-17740 [hereinafter Education Law Center 
Comment] (noting that “[t]he Department fails to explain, beyond a single quote 
from John Henry Wigmore, why cross-examination is more likely to find the truth 
than less confrontational methods of probing and investigating, such as utilizing writ-
ten questions”).
117. Education Law Center Comment, supra note 116, at 17.
118. Frank E. Vandervort, A Search for the Truth or Trial by Ordeal: When Prosecutors 
Cross Examine Adolescents How Should Courts Respond?, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 335, 
335 (2010) (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW, § 1367, at 32 (James H. Chabourn ed., 1974)). This is particularly concerning 
in the campus sexual assault context, which can lack trained adjudicators and repre-
sentatives, as well as the rules of evidence.
119. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 582 (noting that “[w]ithout the back-and-forth of adversarial 
questioning, the accused cannot probe the witness’s story to test her memory, intelli-
gence, or potential ulterior motives”).
120. These include law professors Edmund M. Morgan and Charles T. McCormick. See
ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE,
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION, § 1.6 (2019).
121. Id. (“[F]or example, by presenting testimony that a witness was not wearing glasses 
and testimony that the witness needed them.”).
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tion.122 Witnesses who lie are often able to tell the same story time and 
again without gaps or mistakes.123 Usually, deceptive witnesses cannot 
be broken by either oath or counsel unless “either witness or counsel is 
unusually stupid.”124 Meanwhile, studies have shown that the stress of 
cross-examination “impairs memory and reduces the accuracy of testi-
mony.”125 Cross-examination’s value in uncovering gaps in memory or 
perception is duplicative at best and misleading at worst.
Second, proponents of cross-examination suggest that its principal 
value lies in its capacity to reveal and inhibit deception.126 However, it 
should be noted that social psychologists have yet to study the role of 
cross-examination in uncovering evasion or ulterior motives.127 It is un-
clear whether cross-examination offers any unique benefits in this role. 
What is clear is that there are other ways of revealing biases or ulterior 
motives that are less harmful to the accuser.128 For example, the observa-
tions of an eyewitness can highlight “bias, insanity, or inconsisten-
cies.”129 Relying on hearsay is acceptable here as in many similar civil 
contexts. Adjudicators are able to rely upon hearsay evidence instead of 
cross-examination in findings of responsibility in prisons that may add
years to a prisoner’s sentence, child custody determinations, adjudica-
tions on Social Security Disability benefits, as well as decisions to revoke 
a police officer’s duty disability payments or a store’s cigarette and lot-
tery license.130 Beyond hearsay, there are other tools to uncover a majori-
ty of the information solicited on cross-examination including “calling 
other witnesses or by describing inferences in final argument.”131
Anecdotal evidence suggests that efforts to elicit inconsistent state-
ments on cross-examination typically fail.132 For example, Judge John 
Kane noted that most evocations of prior inconsistent statements are 
122. Cf. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 186–88 (1948) (noting that a witness willing to commit per-
jury on cross-examination will “tell a simple story, free of all complications [and] try 
to explain suggested inconsistencies; he will purport to remember only the rather ob-
vious and give no reason for failure to remember anything else”).
123. Id. at 186.
124. Id.
125. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
210 (1994).
126. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.8.
127. Id. at § 1.7.
128. See id. at § 1.1.
129. Id.
130. See SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 62.
131. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.8.
132. See, e.g., John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION 31, 32 (2007); Morgan, 
supra note 122, at 188; PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.11.
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“trivial and seldom lead to an admission that the present testimony is 
false.”133 The revelation of “willful falsehood” on cross-examination is 
rare.134 It should also be noted that the value in demonstrating decep-
tion varies based on the context of a case. Lies in response to humiliat-
ing or degrading questions about topics such as sex acts are not neces-
sarily indicative of a willingness to lie about other matters.135 Not only 
are efforts to uncover inconsistent statements likely to fail in campus 
sexual assault adjudications, but any “lies” uncovered may stem from 
shame rather than deception or false accusation.136
Third, case law connects the importance of cross-examination to 
the ability to assess a witness’s demeanor and thus probe his or her cred-
ibility. The court in Baum noted that “the value of cross-examination is 
tied to the fact-finder’s ability to assess the witness’s demeanor.”137
There is a belief that the way a person testifies is uniquely informative of 
whether a person is worthy of belief.138 However, it should be noted that 
there is no support for demeanor evidence being more valuable in prob-
ing credibility than any number of the credibility assessment tools of-
fered in typical jury instructions.139 Jury instructions do not privilege 
any particular method of credibility assessment, instead offering jurors 
various ways to probe credibility, including (1) the impact of a witness’s
“background, training, education, or experience” on their credibility; (2) 
an assessment of a witness’s biases, motivations, and interests in the out-
come of the case, and potential motives to lie; (3) a witness’s criminal 
background; and (4) the relative consistency between the statements of a 
witness and the statements of others.140 Beyond conclusory allegations 
for the unique value of demeanor evidence, there seems to be no reason 
for valuing demeanor evidence and live testimony over other forms of 
circumscribed cross-examination in campus sexual assault adjudications
permissible under the University of Cincinnati precedent.
Additionally, empirical evidence indicates that demeanor evidence 
is actually more harmful than helpful in campus sexual assault adjudica-
133. See Kane, supra note 132, at 32.
134. Morgan, supra note 122, at 186.
135. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.11.
136. See id.
137. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 
872 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 2017)).
138. Baum, 903 F.3d at 581; Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 402.
139. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, Credibility of Witnesses, in 2 CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY (2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Credibility.pdf.
140. Id. at 2–3.
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tions.141 In 2017, the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy published 
a survey of available scientific evidence, which indicated that behavioral 
cues discerned from cross-examination are of little benefit to both lay-
people and experts in detecting deception.142 There are three preeminent 
explanations for the limited value of demeanor evidence.
First, the stress of the courtroom minimizes the value of demeanor 
evidence.143 Testifying is a strange and terrifying experience for most 
people, which can affect mannerisms or speech patterns.144 Research in-
dicates that “a witness’s nervous or stumbling response to adversarial 
questioning is more likely an ordinary human reaction to stress than an 
indicator of false testimony.”145 Second, adjudicators are unfamiliar with 
the personal proclivities or mannerisms of a witness.146 For example, 
they do not know “what makes one person stammer or hesitate.”147 In 
the absence of baseline knowledge of a person’s behaviors, demeanor ev-
idence is even less valuable.148 Furthermore, there is not enough time to 
understand how each witness operates; adjudicators are only able to ob-
serve witnesses for an extremely short period of time.149 Third, signs of 
nervousness or fear may be more strongly correlated with innocence 
than deception.150 For those that are guilty, rehearsing arguments can 
bolster confidence and minimize fear of detection; meanwhile, those 
that are in fact innocent often fear being disbelieved, showing visible 
signs of fear.151 In light of limitations with demeanor evidence, the value 
of such cues may not always exceed that of chance.152 It matters not 
whether an adjudicator relies on facial expressions,153 patterns of 
141. H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the 
Opportunity for Tuning up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented,” 27 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 145, 155–56 (2017).
142. Id.
143. See Kane, supra note 132, at 31.
144. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Keep Cross-Examination Out of College Sexual-Assault Cases,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Keep-
Cross-Examination-Out-of/245448?cid=wcontentlist_hp_5.
145. Id.
146. See Kane, supra note 132, at 31.
147. Id.
148. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.5.
149. See Kane, supra note 132, at 31.
150. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.5.
151. Id.
152. See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES
234–35 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing a study finding that demeanor lie detectors had an 
accuracy rate of fifty-four percent).
153. See Goldberg, supra note 144.
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speech,154 or body language.155 All are of little value in uncovering the 
truth.
On the whole, direct, adversarial cross-examination appears to be 
more harmful than helpful in the task of uncovering the truth in cam-
pus sexual assault adjudications. Experts contend that in this context, 
“aggressive, adversarial questioning is more likely to distort reality than 
enable truth-telling.”156 Furthermore, cross-examination tends to present 
conflicting testimony in a dramatic fashion that can distract from the 
truth.157 The value of cross-examination should hinge on its capacity to 
ensure just verdicts. Evidence suggests that cross-examination often in-
hibits principled outcomes; its value appears more theatrical than practi-
cal. In sum, cross-examination in campus sexual assault adjudications 
lacks both a substantive legal grounding and empirical support for its 
value as a truth-finding device.
III. The Proposed Rulemaking Fails to Fully Appreciate and 
Counteract the Vast Negative Consequences of Compulsory, 
Live Cross-Examination
The merits of the proposed rulemaking are weakened by its neglect 
of significant, adverse consequences, such as negative implications for 
reporting rates and increased institutional costs.158
154. See Kane, supra note 132, at 31.
155. Studies have indicated that there is a lack of evidence “to support the hypothesis that 
lying is accompanied by distinctive body behavior that others can discern.” PARK &
LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.5 (citing Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991)).
156. See Goldberg, supra note 144. Cross-examination is especially dangerous for impres-
sionable or young witnesses, where the pressure of the adversarial questioning may 
steer them toward appeasing the questioner over telling the truth. See Education Law 
Center Comment, supra note 116, at 17.
157. PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.8.
158. For brevity, I will neglect additional repercussions, such as lingering vulnerabilities 
for students under the age of 18 at colleges and universities. The proposed rule points 
out that cross-examination is not compulsory in adjudications at K-12 schools 
“[b]ecause most parties and many witnesses are minors in the [K-12] context, sensi-
tivities associated with age and developmental ability may outweigh the benefits of 
cross-examination at a live hearing.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Educa-
tion Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 
61462, 61476 (Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). However, this 
dichotomy between K-12 schools and institutions of higher education ignores the 
fact that hundreds of thousands of college students are under the age of 18. It also 
fails to appreciate the fluidity of the American educational system. Intersections be-
tween institutions of higher education and K-12 schools are significant due to dual 
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First, mandatory cross-examination is likely to lead to a decrease in 
the already low reporting rates for campus sexual assault. Aggressive and 
dramatic questioning that focuses on detailed and humiliating aspects of 
the assault without protections will only exacerbate the power dynamics 
between the victim and the accused. Second, the proposed rulemaking 
drastically increases the costs to colleges and universities of adjudicating 
sexual assault allegations. Costs include hiring adjudicators as well as 
training advisors for students unable to obtain independent counsel. 
Lastly, the proposed rulemaking neglects the Mathews balancing test to 
determine the dictates of due process in the context of campus sexual 
assault. It overextends due process for the accused and eliminates im-
portant due process protections for the victim.159 The proposed rule-
making therefore contradicts established due process jurisprudence.
A. Adverse Implications for Reporting Rates
The proposed rulemaking disregards the impact compulsory cross-
examination will have on victims and their ability to come forward. Di-
rect cross-examination will foster a “hostile and confrontational hearing 
process” 160 with immense potential to re-traumatize survivors.161 Con-
cerns for trauma are so acute in the proposed rulemaking that experts 
expect that students will be deterred from filing complaints.162
A decrease in reporting is likely due to four main factors. First,
popular perceptions of the general tone of cross-examination serve as 
strong deterrents. Cross-examination is portrayed in the media as an 
aggressive and dramatic device.163 Jeffrey J. Nolan, a lawyer who advises 
colleges on Title IX issues, predicted that victims are likely to be
enrollment programs, summer programs, student teaching programs, and colleges 
operating K-12 charter schools. It is unclear which system and accompanying rights 
apply in cases where one party is a K-12 student and another party is a college stu-
dent.
159. Analysis of the accusers’ due process rights is beyond the scope of this Comment.
160. Deborah J. Vagins, Senior Vice President, Pub. Policy & Research, Am. Ass’n of 
Univ. Women, Comment Re: ED Docket No. ED-2018-OCR-0064, RIN 1870-
AA14, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance 15 (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-31034.
161. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Comment on FR Doc # 2018-25314 2 (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-30626.
162. See Goldberg, supra note 144.
163. See, e.g., Sarah Brown & Katherine Mangan, What You Need to Know About the Pro-
posed Title IX Regulations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-Know-About/245118.
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deterred from reporting if they “picture themselves in a courtroom 
being yelled at about their sexual history the way you see on TV 
shows.”164
Second, the types of questions asked on cross-examination further 
dissuade survivors from coming forward.165 Cross-examination will open 
the door to “detailed, personal, and humiliating questions often rooted 
in gender stereotypes and rape myths that tend to blame victims for the 
assault they experienced.”166 Questions may be structured with the in-
tent to embarrass or traumatize the complainant and may tactlessly 
delve into irrelevant or sensitive topics, such as mental health, substance 
abuse, or immaterial details of the alleged incident.167 This risk is espe-
cially acute given the absence of the rules of evidence in campus sexual 
assault adjudications.168
Third, the suggested limits on cross-examination fail to neutralize 
these risks. The proposed rulemaking places sparse limits on the types of 
questions that may be asked.169 The proposed rulemaking proclaims that 
it “incorporate[s] language from (and . . . in the spirit of) the rape shield 
protections found in Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 412.”170 However, 
the scope of the exceptions under FRE 412 (or a rule mirroring it) is 
vast. For example, the exception for admitting “evidence when its exclu-
sion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights” has traditional-
ly been especially dangerous in exposing a victim to harmful question-
ing.171 In the legal system, courts frequently “misinterpret and 
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Women and Girls in Educ., Comment RE: ED Docket No. 
ED-2018-OCR-0064, RIN 1870-AA14, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in 
Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance 5 (Jan. 30, 
2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-18420
[hereinafter NCWGE Comment].
166. Id.
167. Andrew Kreighbaum, New Uncertainty on Title IX, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 20, 
2018) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/20/title-ix-rules-cross-
examination-would-make-colleges-act-courts-lawyers-say.
168. Questions may contain assertions that “hurt the witness without much advancing the 
cause of truth-finding.” PARK & LININGER, supra note 120, at § 1.10.
169. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,476 (Nov. 29, 2018) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (laying out the limits on cross-examination).
170. Id. Notably, the exceptions to FED. R. EVID. 412 are also incorporated into the pro-
posed rule.
171. Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent 
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 56 (2002) (noting that this 
exception “often crumbles what is left of the [rape] shield because courts routinely 
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exaggerate” this exception.172 A similar result would likely take place in 
campus sexual assault adjudications.173
The proposed rulemaking also boldly asserts that it will “avoid[] 
any unnecessary trauma that could arise from personal confrontation”
by ensuring that an advisor (rather than the accused) questions the vic-
tim and allowing either side to ask for the parties to be located in differ-
ent rooms for cross-examination.174 However, these protections do not 
go far enough. The proposed rulemaking does not mandate sophisticat-
ed representatives and adjudicators.175 It fails to dictate who may con-
duct cross-examination (apart from the exclusion of the parties), as well 
as what qualifications or training are necessary.176 This means that “in-
dividuals wholly untrained in cross-examination, such as fraternity 
brothers, parents, peers, or even faculty members” will be tasked with 
carrying out cross-examination.177 Mistakes in properly discerning and 
respecting the bounds of exceptions to FRE 412 are expected to be ex-
acerbated by untrained representatives and adjudicators.178 As a result, 
proceedings are expected to be “chaotic [and] uncontrolled.”179
Fourth, contrasts in resources and institutional power between the 
victim and the accused could discourage victims from seeking justice. 
Assailants appear to target vulnerable parties.180 In Title IX cases, there 
have long been concerns about the stark contrasts between male 
respondents who can afford counsel and female reporting parties who 
cannot.181 Demographics such as “children; immigrants; those 
misinterpret and exaggerate the scope of the defendant’s constitutional right to in-
quire into the complainant’s sexual history . . .”).
172. Id. (noting this is especially true when “complainant is deemed promiscuous with the 
defendant or others”).
173. The room for error in misinterpreting and exaggerating this exception is perhaps even 
greater in the campus sexual assault adjudication process, which tends to lack legal 
counsel and adjudicators with legal training.
174. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,476.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Victim Rights Law Ctr., Public Comment by the Victim Rights Law Ctr. on the 
Dep’t of Ed.’s Proposed Regulations Regarding Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, 29 (2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-
OCR-0064-6471 [hereinafter VRLC Comment].
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Kathryn Casteel et al., What We Know About Victims of Sexual Assault in America,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 2, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/
sexual-assault-victims/ (noting that “perpetrators are more likely to target victims who 
are less likely to report what happened,” notably poor women).
181. Id.
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dependent upon the harasser for employment, scholarship funds or 
work study or a letter of recommendation in their chosen field; 
individuals with disabilities; transgender and gender non-binary 
[persons]” are also especially vulnerable in sexual assault adjudications.182
The more active and adversarial role of advisors under the proposed 
rulemaking compounds these concerns. If a victim knows that a 
perpetrator has institutional power, access to substantial resources, and 
sophisticated counsel, this will create a “powerful incentive to not 
persist.”183
As a result of these factors, the proposed rulemaking is expected to 
cause as high as a fifty-percent drop in reporting.184 This is especially 
alarming given that anecdotal evidence on college campuses indicates 
that students are already under-reporting due to the burdens of existing 
procedure.185 Currently, roughly seventy-seven percent of rape and sexu-
al assault cases are not reported.186 As procedural requirements expand, 
reporting is anticipated to decline further.187 The proposed rulemaking 
reflects a clear concern for preventing false accusations.188 However, false 
accusations are estimated to be as low as two to eight percent.189 In its 
efforts to combat false reporting, the proposed rulemaking heightens the 
risk of under-reporting—a far more pervasive problem in the campus 
sexual assault adjudication process.190
182. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 50.
183. Kreighbaum, supra note 167.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Emily A. Springston, Univ. Dir. of Inst. Equity & Title IX, Ind. Univ., 
Comment Letter Re: ED-2018-OCR-0064 (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-14825 [hereinafter 
IU Comment].
186. Ronda M. Baldwn, Title IX Adm’r, Ohio Christian Univ., Comment on Notice of 
Proposed Title IX Rulemaking, 2 n.6 (Jan. 28, 2019) https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-68557 [hereinafter OCU Comment] (citing
Casteel et al., supra note 180).
187. See IU Comment, supra note 185.
188. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,474 (Nov. 29, 2018) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
189. See OCU Comment, supra note 186, at 2 n.6 (citing David Lisak et al., False Allega-
tions of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1322 (2010)).
190. E.g., Michael K. Le Roy, President, Calvin Coll., Comment on Notice of Proposed 
Title IX Rulemaking, 2 (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-68547 [hereinafter Calvin College Comment].
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B. Significant Costs Incurred by Colleges and Universities
The proposed rulemaking disregards the substantial costs colleges 
and universities will incur from implementing these procedures. The 
proposed rulemaking proclaims that compulsory, live cross-examination 
is not anticipated to result in any substantively increased costs for higher 
education institutions.191 However, the cost estimate “assume[s] all par-
ties obtain counsel,”192 a proposition that is highly unlikely and un-
founded. It also ignores substantial costs universities will incur from 
training advisors and defending lawsuits.193
Under the proposed rulemaking, colleges and universities would be 
required to provide students with advisors when they are unable to ob-
tain one on their own accord.194 Colleges and universities are expected 
to be regularly tasked with fulfilling this obligation.195 Some advocates 
have suggested that colleges and universities must provide students with 
access to legal counsel in light of these new changes.196 Although the 
provision of counsel is not strictly required, many institutions will feel 
substantial pressure to hire lawyers to serve as advisors and retired judges 
to serve as adjudicators in these hearings, resulting in substantial in-
creased compliance costs.197 The State University of New York has esti-
mated that “the likely costs of a single proceeding will easily run into the 
tens of thousands of dollars.”198 The financial implications of university-
provided counsel are impractical for the overwhelming majority of insti-
tutions across the country.199
191. See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 
61,476. The proposed rulemaking on Title IX in the aggregate predicts cost savings 
up to $367.7 million over a ten year period. Id. at 61,484.
192. Id. at 61,488.
193. See SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 5, 57.
194. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,488.
195. See e.g., Goldberg, supra note 144.
196. Id.
197. For example, Baylor has hired retired judges to conduct campus sexual assault adjudi-
cations on multiple occasions and at great expense. See Sarah Brown, When Kenneth 
Starr Gives the Keynote at a Higher Ed Conference, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 3, 
2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/When-Kenneth-Starr-Gives-the/245602.
198. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 65. See also, OCU Comment, supra note 186, at 
5 (noting the substantial costs of the proposed rulemaking).
199. Goldberg, supra note 144 (noting “[o]f more than 4,000 higher-education institu-
tions in the United States, few have lawyers on staff to serve in that role, and even 
fewer (just over 200) have accredited law schools with faculty members or students 
who might pitch in”).
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Even if institutions of higher education need not hire attorneys to 
serve as advisors and conduct cross-examinations, advisors and 
adjudicators presumably must be trained to conduct cross-examinations
effectively and in accordance with the proposed rulemaking, while 
minimizing trauma to the victim.200 Designing and executing a training 
regime would undoubtedly result in a significant expenditure of money 
and resources.201 An especially challenging detail will be managing 
advisors that lack an institutional affiliation.202 Technically speaking, the 
proposed rulemaking lacks guidance on what sort of training is 
necessary.203 At this juncture, it seems that it is possible for institutions 
to provide no specialized training to advocates or adjudicators 
whatsoever.204 However, for those institutions that bypass specialized 
training, the likelihood of victim re-traumatization and adverse 
reporting implications will rise substantially.205 Such evasion of 
responsibility could also expose universities to greater liability.206
It is plausible that colleges and universities will be exposed to litiga-
tion challenging the execution of cross-examination in adjudications.207
For example, survivors may sue for improper adherence to rules mirror-
ing FRE 412.208 Students provided advisors by their institution may 
raise claims analogous to ineffective assistance of counsel.209 The costs 
associated with such litigation could be substantial.210
It is true that some universities are positioned to meet these sub-
stantial anticipated costs. Elite private colleges and well-resourced public 
universities may be equipped to meet this requirement.211 For example, 
the court in Baum pointed out that the financial impact at the Universi-
200. See IU Comment, supra note 185, at 3.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,476 (Nov. 29, 2018) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (explaining cross-examination requirement 
without providing for training requirements).
204. Id.
205. See IU Comment, supra note 185, at 10 (noting the importance of specialized train-
ing).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Kreighbaum, supra note 167.
208. Id. FED. R. EVID. 412 generally prohibits the use of (1) “evidence offered to prove 
that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior” or (2) “evidence offered to prove a 
victim’s sexual predisposition” in civil or criminal cases involving alleged sexual mis-
conduct. Discrete exceptions to this rule are noted in FED. R. EVID. 412(b).
209. See, e.g., Kreighbaum, supra note 167. See also IU Comment, supra note 185, at 10.
210. See SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 5, 14.
211. Kreighbaum, supra note 167.
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ty of Michigan should be limited, given that the university provides for 
a hearing with cross-examination in all other disciplinary adjudica-
tions.212 However, there are still many universities that lack the financial 
resources and staff necessary to meet this requirement.213 For those 
schools, the costs associated with the proposed rulemaking could result 
in tuition hikes and significant cuts in academic programming.214 In 
sum, the proposed rulemaking’s assertion that substantial increased costs 
should not be anticipated is unfounded. Considerations of the impacts 
on reporting and increased costs weigh heavily in the Mathews balancing 
described below.
C. Neglect of the Mathews Balancing Test
The proposed rulemaking improperly bypasses the Mathews bal-
ancing test.215 The process owed is context specific; the dictates of due 
process are established via a case-by-case approach applying the Mathews
test.216 Under this test, the amount of process owed is based on: “(1) the 
nature of the private interest subject to official action; (2) the risk of er-
roneous deprivation under the current procedures used, and the value of 
any additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the govern-
mental interest, including the burden any additional or substitute pro-
cedures might entail.”217 The blanket mandate in the proposed rulemak-
ing obliterates individuated analysis under Mathews to discern whether 
cross-examination is warranted in a particular case.218 Even assuming an
individualized assessment was unnecessary, and all colleges and claims 
were substantially similar in positioning, the proposed rulemaking fails 
to pass muster under a holistic application of the Mathews balancing 
212. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018). Although additional expenditures 
should still be expected, Michigan has a substantial endowment. Still, Baum neglects 
associated costs, such as specialized training necessary for campus sexual assault advi-
sors and adjudicators, as well as increased exposure to liability.
213. See, e.g., OCU Comment, supra note 186, at 5.
214. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 65.
215. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,475-76 (Nov. 29, 2018) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
217. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 334–35).
218. Note that Baum left room for cases where credibility was not an issue, at least allow-
ing for some individual analysis. The proposed rulemaking obliterates any remaining 
capacity to determine what process is warranted in a discrete context.
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test. Instead, the proposed rulemaking exaggerates the due process rights 
of the accused while minimizing those of the accuser.
First, it is necessary to assess the private interest at stake.219 In cam-
pus sexual assault adjudications, there is a property interest220 in higher 
education as well as a liberty interest stemming from the adverse impli-
cations of a guilty finding on a student’s reputation and integrity.221 It 
should be noted that the property rights in dispute in campus sexual as-
sault adjudications are weaker than the property rights at issue in the K-
12 education setting, given that the right to a K-12 education is guaran-
teed by law.222 Still, the interests in dispute are significant. The court in 
University of Cincinnati noted that “[a] finding of responsibility for a 
sexual offense can have a ‘lasting impact’ on a student’s personal life, in 
addition to his ‘educational and employment opportunities,’ especially 
when the disciplinary action involves a long-term suspension.”223 How-
ever, it is necessary to keep in mind the range of sanctions in university 
adjudications. Campus sexual assault adjudications rarely result in sus-
pension, and even more rarely result in expulsion.224 More importantly, 
even the harshest penalty—expulsion with a transcript notation—pales 
in comparison to prison, sex offender registration, or other forms of 
criminal sanction.225 In sum, while there is a significant private interest 
at stake, severe consequences are rare and fall far short of criminal con-
sequences.
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of addi-
tional safeguards must be considered.226 Case law suggests a high risk of 
219. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35).
220. The property interest stems from the significant temporal and monetary investments 
in a college education. See O’Toole, supra note 22, at 530.
221. See Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399.
222. SUNY Comment, supra note 49, at 59.
223. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2017).
224. Suspensions are often brief in duration. It is estimated that only thirteen to thirty
percent of students found responsible for sexual assault are suspended from institu-
tions of higher education. Kingkade, supra note 85. Even for those students who re-
ceive a punishment like expulsion or suspension, only two states (New York and Vir-
ginia) require transcript notations explaining that the disciplinary action was 
connected to sexual assault. See New, supra note 85. This allows perpetrators found 
guilty of sexual assault to easily transfer to a new school and resume their education. 
Id.
225. The discrepancy in punishments doled out by colleges and universities and criminal 
sanctions has traditionally allowed for less process in campus sexual assault adjudica-
tions. See Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 400.
226. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334–35 (1976)).
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erroneous deprivation in cases involving credibility disputes.227 Credibil-
ity disputes are often central to sexual assault adjudications.228 However, 
the scope of the risk seems limited, given that the rate of false accusa-
tions falls between two and eight percent.229 Even if there is a substantial 
risk of erroneous deprivation, as discussed in Section II, there is sparse 
evidence that direct, adversarial cross-examination in this context by un-
trained advisors actually results in accurate outcomes.230 Contrarily, evi-
dence suggests cross-examination can inhibit efforts to uncover the 
truth.231 There are also reasonable alternatives to direct, adversarial 
cross-examination for probing the truth.232 In fact, the Department of 
Education freely admits that written questions submitted by students or 
oral questioning conducted by a neutral adjudicator are lawful and fair 
methods to discern the truth in K-12 adjudications.233 Several courts 
have echoed the merits of a circumscribed form of cross-examination, 
preferring the approach to direct, adversarial cross-examination.234 For 
these reasons, the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of private in-
terests appears limited, and the value of adversarial cross-examination as 
an additional safeguard is lacking.235
Third, the government interest (i.e. the college or university’s in-
terest) and the burden of additional or substitute procedures must be 
contemplated.236 Courts have consistently noted skepticism of formaliz-
ing campus adjudications237 due to the significant burden of incorporat-
227. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 401–02.
228. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 406.
229. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, of the two to ten percent falsely accused, the 
vast majority will receive consequences far less severe than suspension or expulsion. 
OCU Comment, supra note 186, at 2 n.6 (citing Lisak et al., supra note 189, at 
1322); see supra note 224 and accompanying text.
230. See discussion supra Section II (concerning the value of cross-examination as a truth-
finding device).
231. See, e.g., supra text accompanying 119–40.
232. See, e.g., NCWGE Comment, supra note 165, at 6.
233. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,476 (Nov. 29, 2018) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
234. See, e.g., Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., No. 1:18-CV-1374 (FJS/CFH), 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5396, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019); Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-
Fayetteville, No. 5:18-CV-05182, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57889, at *27 (W.D. Ark. 
Apr. 3, 2019).
235. See Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5396, at *21; Univ. of Ark.-
Fayetteville, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57889, at *27.
236. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)).
237. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (noting “further formalizing the
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only 
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ing trial-like components, such as cross-examination, into campus sexual 
assault adjudications.238 College administrators are “ill-equipped” to 
administer adjudications involving cross-examination since they lack the 
legal expertise required to follow procedures analogous to the rules of 
evidence.239 Adversarial cross-examination also interferes with the focus 
on community and the education process shared by many institutions of 
higher education.240 Additionally, as noted in Section III.B, the costs 
and procedural difficulties of incorporating cross-examination into 
campus sexual assault adjudications would be great. In light of adequate 
substitute procedures, the added expense of administering direct, adver-
sarial cross-examination is not only unnecessary, but also is untenable 
for many institutions.241
In sum, while there is a sizeable interest at stake, the risk of errone-
ous deprivation appears limited. Even if the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion is acute, it does not appear that cross-examination is successful in 
mitigating this risk in campus sexual assault adjudications. Meanwhile, 
the burden of incorporating live, adversarial cross-examination into 
campus adjudications would be significant and viable alternatives can be 
implemented. Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh against the codi-
fication of the proposed rulemaking on cross-examination. While it is 
possible that some cases on balance call for in-person, adversarial cross-
examination, the Department of Education has marshalled insufficient 
evidence for the value of such procedures across all cases and contexts. 
The proposed rulemaking overextends due process for the accused. 
While private institutions are free to implement processes as they see fit, 
it is imprudent for the Department of Education to mandate such a 
framework for all institutions of higher education.
Conclusion
As it stands, the proposed rulemaking for compulsory cross-
examination is ill-conceived, lacking substantive legal and empirical 
support. Department of Education administrators ignore the sweeping 
consequences of these requirements. It seems clear that the focus is on 
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part 
of the teaching process”).
238. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 404.
239. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 404.
240. See, e.g., Calvin College Comment, supra note 190, at 2–3.
241. See discussion supra Section III.B (concerning the significant costs that educational 
institutions will incur under the proposed rule).
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symbolism over substance, with the goal of appeasing advocates of the 
accused. Nonetheless, compulsory cross-examination should stand or 
fall based on its value in uncovering the truth and protecting important 
rights. Indeed, that is what the Mathews balancing test implores.242 In 
the educational context, on balance, adversarial cross-examination is 
more harmful than helpful.243 The Department of Education should 
heed the guidance of thousands of comments and refrain from mandat-
ing compulsory adversarial cross-examination.244
In spite of what is legal and prudent, implementation may be inevi-
table. What is perhaps more troubling is that the proposed rulemaking 
provides little guidance or analysis on the impact of this rule and how it 
will work in practice.245 Prior to implementation, a system of rules must 
be conceived to constrain questioning, which provides for pertinent ob-
jections and guides adjudicators on how to rule on objections. Assuming 
counsel is allowed to serve in an advisory capacity, equal access to coun-
sel must be ensured. All efforts must be taken to minimize trauma to the 
victim, safeguard the rights of the accused, and protect the financial via-
bility of educational institutions.
242. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
243. See, e.g., Education Law Center Comment, supra note 116, at 29–31 (noting that 
cross-examination, while helpful in some contexts, is on balance inappropriate in Ti-
tle IX proceedings because it can traumatize victims, spur on appeasement of the ag-
gressor rather than truth telling, and unnecessarily legalize the Title IX process).
244. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,476 (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-0001(indicating 
that 124,196 comments have been received).
245. A leaked earlier copy of the proposed rulemaking suggests that the compulsory cross-
examination requirement was opportunistically added in the wake of Baum. This 
perhaps explains the lack of detail on how this rule will be implemented. See Dep’t of 
Educ., Office of Civil Rights, Proposed Regulation Concerning Title IX (un-
published draft) (Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with ATIXA), https://cdn.atixa.org/website-
media/o_atixa/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/18120534/Draft-OCR-regulations-
September-2018.pdf.
